In most of our states, musical chairs in the bureaucracy have almost become the norm. Senior IAS officers often barely settle into a post before being shunted out, despite the Supreme Court and civil service rules recommending a minimum tenure of two years to ensure administrative stability. Consequently, progress suffers.
Fixed tenures are essential for good governance, except in some cases where the officer is unfit. Officers also need some time to understand their departments, build institutional memory, and see projects through. When they are abruptly transferred, continuity is broken, institutional knowledge is lost, and incoming officers must spend critical time just getting up to speed. The result is reactive governance, where bureaucrats prioritise their own survival over performance.
Recognising this challenge, the Supreme Court in T.S.R. Subramanian and Others versus Union of India and Others (October 2013) directed the governments at the Centre and in the states to ensure minimum fixed tenures for civil service officers and mandated the establishment of Civil Services Boards (CSBs) at both the Central and state levels. Responding to this, the IAS (Cadre) Rules 1954 were amended in 2014 to codify a two-year minimum tenure per posting and to require each state to form a CSB to review early transfers. However, despite these formal reforms, the ground reality remains largely unchanged. Many states have yet to establish functioning CSBs, and frequent transfers continue unabated, reflecting poor implementation and political apathy.
Nowhere is this more evident than in state-level transfer patterns. In Rajasthan, 62 IAS officers, including 11 district collectors, were transferred in June 2025 alone mirroring a similar mass reshuffle in 2018 following a change in government. Such movements abruptly derail ongoing initiatives in infrastructure, health and welfare delivery.
Tamil Nadu, a state otherwise lauded for administrative professionalism, is not immune to the problem. In June 2025, 55 IAS officers were reshuffled in what was officially described as a performance-driven exercise.
Telangana, once a model of administrative continuity following its formation in 2014, has also succumbed to volatility. The political shift in 2023 triggered a wave of bureaucratic reshuffles. Within a span of months, several key IAS officers were moved, some serving only five to six months in their roles. The municipal administration department alone cycled through four commissioners in one year, with one officer serving for just a month. Such disruption undermines institutional learning and hinders the delivery of vital urban programmes.
Kerala, by contrast, presents a rare case where institutional checks have begun to function. In 2023, the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) issued an interim order restraining the Kerala government from making arbitrary transfers without consulting the Civil Services Board. The case was prompted by the premature transfer of several IAS officers, including one who was barely months into the role. The CAT ruled that these actions violated both the All-India Service (Conduct) Rules and Supreme Court guidelines. As a result, the state was compelled to reinstate certain officers and bring its transfer practices closer to procedural norms. While full compliance remains a work in progress, the intervention has strengthened accountability and public scrutiny.
Quantitative evidence reinforces these patterns. A 2024 study, Meritocracy vs. Bureaucratic Patronage, provides systematic data showing how transfer instability correlates with weaker governance outcomes. Uttar Pradesh stands out as one of the worst performers, with key district-level officers averaging just 1.3 years in a single posting. The study links this bureaucratic churn with lower effectiveness in public service delivery as projects are frequently delayed, implementation is inconsistent, and accountability is diluted.
On the other hand, the study highlights Kerala and Maharashtra as states that have managed to institutionalise more stable administrative practices. In Kerala, average tenures in district postings stand at 2.7 years, and post-election reshuffles remain relatively contained. Maharashtra, benefiting from the earlier adoption of internal transfer protocols and a somewhat less politicised administrative culture, also records higher average tenures. These examples demonstrate that with the right institutional framework, tenure stability can be achieved even in politically dynamic states.
The consequences of ignoring tenure norms go far beyond personal inconvenience for bureaucrats. India’s bureaucracy, often described as the “steel frame” of governance, is being quietly corroded by arbitrary transfers.
Officers who are repeatedly moved before they can make a meaningful impact are reduced to being glorified couriers rather than genuine policy implementers. When postings become tools of patronage and transfers are wielded as political punishment, we risk losing both administrative competence and public trust.
To reverse this trend, reforms must move decisively from paper to practice. First, states must operationalise and empower Civil Services Boards, ensuring that they become the default authority on transfers. Transfer orders, especially those issued within the two-year threshold, should be published online with written justifications for transparency.
Second, tenure-tracking dashboards must be developed at the state level to monitor average durations of service by department, role, and district in real time.
Third, there must be formal penalties or institutional checks whether through audit reports, legislative review, or judicial oversight for politically motivated or arbitrary reshuffling. Finally, officers who face retaliatory or unjustified transfers should have access to an independent grievance redressal mechanism, a critical gap in the current system.
India’s governance will only be as strong as the institutional integrity of its public administration. If we continue to shuffle officers without regard for tenure, purpose, or performance, we may find that the steel frame has rusted from within.
The writer is the secretary-general of CUTS International, a 42-year-old leading global public policy research and advocacy group.
Anushka Kewlani contributed to this article
